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Only a fraction of real world labor contracts make substantial use of explicit monetary
incentives, and those that do often have only weak monetary incentives. Lemieux et al.
(2007) ¯nd that in the United States only 37% of individuals have some kind of pay-for-
performance component to their compensation, and that among those who do the median
magnitude of these incentives is only 3.5% of their base wage.1 This prevalence of weak
(monetary) incentives in real world contracts, while apparently still obtaining non-trivial
e®ort, is not well explained by the standard approach in contract theory which emphasizes
the use of output realizations as a (noisy) measure of employee e®ort to overcome the moral
hazard problem. In these models, by tying the level of the agent's compensation to the
amount of output produced, the agent is given monetary incentives to increase his output.2
We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives and solve for the optimal
contract in the basic principal-agent problem with reciprocal agents. We show that reciprocal
motivations, i.e. the fact that an individual values positively the utility of someone who
has been kind to the individual, and explicit performance-based pay are substitutes and
that the use of reciprocal incentives decreases agency costs. In the optimal contract the
principal makes use of both forms of incentives, using explicit incentives less when the agent
is more reciprocal, and using them more when output is a more informative signal of e®ort.
Reciprocal motivations are more e®ective when the agent's preference for reciprocity is more
pronounced or when it is easier for him to reciprocate, i.e. the bene¯t to the principal from
high e®ort is larger. This last ¯nding allows us to extend our model to capture features of
organizational structure. Interpreting direct supervisors (rather than senior managers) as
the workers' relevant principals, we predict a collocation of incentive pay and decision rights
for these direct supervisors in the ¯rms that use personality tests (a proxy for ¯rms that care
about traits like reciprocity) in their hiring procedure. Furthermore, in those ¯rms incentive
pay for non-managers should be less prevalent, i.e. they rely more on reciprocal incentives,
and the scope of performance pay for managers should be more narrowly de¯ned. We use
the UK WERS workplace survey to con¯rm our predictions.
1Bel¯eld and Marsden (2003) and Piekkola (2005) report similar results for the UK (20% of employees,
and 3.5% of base wages) and Finland (38% of employees and 3.6% of base wages). See also Prendergast
(1999) for a general survey of empirical tests of the standard contracting model.
2Cf. e.g. HolmstrÄ om (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), and HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom (1991). Models
that emphasize multitasking in work tasks have been one explanation why weak, rather than strong, incen-
tives prevail. However, such models typically assume directly that the agent is willing to do some positive
amount of work absent monetary incentives. The use of career incentives is another potential explanation
for the empirical observation.
1In the literature alternative sources of incentives in the workplace have been considered
before. Akerlof (1982) is an early example. He models the labor relation as a gift exchange
where agents respond to generous treatment by the ¯rm (i.e. generous wage packages) by
exerting more than minimal e®ort. While Akerlof's model is based on the e®ect of work
\norms", our paper will build on explicit models of social preferences. In particular we will
use \reciprocity", ¯rst formally described by Rabin (1993), who employed the psychological
games framework of Geanakoplos et al. (1989).3
While the basic idea of reciprocity is both simple and appealing - a reciprocal person wants
to repay kindness with kindness and mischief with mischief - the application to any but the
most simple economic settings is hampered by several problems. 1) In Rabin's model, utility
depends on (higher order) beliefs about the other players' actions and the other players'
beliefs about own actions etc. 2) An important free parameter in his model is the reference
point for a \fair action". In many real world situations it is unclear what the fair reference
point is and whether people agree on it. 3) Due to the importance of higher order beliefs
there always exist multiple (constructive and destructive) reciprocity equilibria.
Outcome based theories, most notably \inequity aversion" by Fehr and Schmidt (1999)4,
have been developed to capture important aspects of the gift exchange intuition while avoid-
ing the above mentioned technical complications.5 These theories simplify the problem by
only conditioning on the ¯nal allocations of resources. Hence inequity aversion trades o®
capturing \reciprocity" directly in preferences for greater tractability. Inequity aversion does
capture directly, however, the separate and important phenomenon of \concern for fairness"
and does remarkably well in explaining observed behavior in laboratory studies of public
good provision, Fehr and GÄ achter (2000), or contract choices, Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
(2007). However, with weak or no monetary incentives, inequity aversion will only induce
e®ort if either 1) the agent begins with a larger payo® than the manager, and the manager
receives > 50% of the pro¯t from the agent's e®ort (thus e®ort reduces the agent's advan-
tageous inequality) or 2) the agent begins with a smaller payo® than the manager, and the
agent receives > 50% of the pro¯t from his own e®ort (thus e®ort reduces the agent's disad-
3See also the later papers by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2005) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) on
reciprocity in sequential games and the paper by Cox et al. (2008) grounding reciprocal preferences in
neoclassical preference and demand theory.
4See also the closely related paper by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
5See Bartling and Von Siemens (2005), Benjamin (2006), Dur and Glazer (2006), and Englmaier and
Wambach (2005) for applications of outcome based models to contracting and incentives, as well as Englmaier
(2005) for a survey of this literature, as well as Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for a broader survey of social
preferences and decision making.
2vantageous inequality). While often true in laboratory gift exchange games, these conditions
are generally not met in real world labor market settings; this motivates our development
of a reciprocity based model that can generate gift exchange regardless of the principal and
agent's relative income and wealth.
Our paper exploits several features of the contracting problem to derive the ¯rst full
characterization of the structure of optimal contracts with reciprocal agents, providing a
theoretical foundation from optimal contracting to \simple" gift exchange reasoning. More-
over, we extend our basic model to capture basic properties of organizational structure and
develop a number of predictions that can be tested empirically. We are able to make progress
in modeling reciprocity because it is very natural to assume that the particular problems
of Rabin's model are absent or at least greatly mitigated in a labor contracting setting. 1)
The contract pins down beliefs. This is obviously most true when a contract includes
goals or performance thresholds. More generally, in a workplace environment we expect
that a ¯rm communicates to a worker the level of performance expected of him (e.g. in a
job description or in a code of conduct), which puts his compensation into context. 2) The
reservation utility, provided for by the labor market, is a very natural reference point for
what constitutes a \fair" action of the ¯rm. Whenever the ¯rm allows the worker to earn a
rent above and beyond his next best alternative in the market, this must be interpreted as a
kind gesture. The higher the rent, the kinder the ¯rm ought to be perceived. 3) The negative
or destructive reciprocity equilibrium does not exist. Due to the agent's individual
rationality constraint it is not possible for the ¯rm to make an unkind o®er that would be
accepted and could result in destructive negative reciprocal behavior by the worker.
We use these natural assumptions to simplify the problem and develop a model capturing
the essence of reciprocity. A risk neutral ¯rm hires a risk averse worker to exert non-
veri¯able e®ort. As in standard agency models, the worker's risk aversion makes imposing
monetary incentives costly. The novelty in our model is that the agent's utility increases in
the principal's revenue, i.e. ¯rm pro¯ts, whenever the ¯rm provides the agent with a rent
in excess of his outside option. Thus when the ¯rm is generous to the agent by giving him
something valuable (additional compensation), the agent desires to provide in turn something
of value to the ¯rm (higher e®ort). The agent's intensity of reciprocal concerns is measured
by a parameter ´: The agent's reciprocal attitude can now be used by the ¯rm to align
the agent's preferences with those of the ¯rm, thus generating intrinsic motivation. Making
use of those the ¯rm can substitute away from using explicit incentives, hence o®ering less
performance sensitive contracts.
3The ¯rm can choose whether to make use of the agent's reciprocal attitude or not. The
standard incentive contract6, which holds the agent down to his outside option, is always
feasible. When this contract is implemented, the agent's concern for reciprocity plays no
role - the standard contract leaves no rent, hence it is neither kind nor unkind and does
not trigger a reciprocal reaction - and the agent reacts to the explicit incentives just as a
standard agent would. We can show that there exists a unique ´¤ such that for all agents
with an ´ > ´¤ at least some degree of intrinsic motivation is induced.
We also derive two main comparative statics on the nature of the optimal contract. When
the agent is more intrinsically reciprocal, i.e. has a higher ´, or when the e®ect of the agent's
e®ort on the principal's revenue is greater, then more reciprocal incentives will be used, i.e.
the lower will be the extent of explicit incentives as measured by the sensitivity of the
agent's remuneration.7 In contrast to that, the more informative the signal is with respect
to the agent's e®ort choice, the more explicit incentives will be used. Hence we can show
that explicit monetary and implicit reciprocal incentives are substitutes in the principal's
optimal incentive mix.
The results of our basic contracting model are di±cult to test using real world data as they
depend on hard to observe parameters of the model like e®ort costs, informativeness of pro¯t,
or the agent's preference for reciprocity. Hence we take our approach one step further and
develop an extension of our basic contracting model, capturing the basic structure of a ¯rm's
hierarchy. The predictions we derive are based on observable features of ¯rm hierarchies and
we can thus use ¯eld data to check our predictions (albeit in a limited fashion).
In the model extension we consider three simple organizational relationships between two
managers within the ¯rm to illustrate the role of managerial compensation and decision-
making for the reciprocity of subordinates. We always assume that the agent feels more
reciprocal towards the person deciding about his contract, i.e. the one making the gift. First,
we consider a situation with a ¯rm owner and a middle manager. The manager determines
the agent's contract, while the owner takes no action. We then vary the strength of the
manager's incentives, i.e. his pay-performance sensitivity. This captures how important the
agent's e®ort is for the manager's pay. We show, that stronger managerial incentives make
reciprocal incentives more e®ective, implying less explicit incentives for the worker. Second,
6I.e., the contract solving the problem with purely sel¯sh agents as laid out by HolmstrÄ om (1979) or
Grossman and Hart (1983).
7Englmaier and Leider (2008) test the predictions of our model w.r.t. the relation of the initial gift and
the e®ect of the agent's e®ort on the principal's revenue both in a lab experiment and in a ¯eld experiment
and ¯nd supportive evidence in both cases.
4we consider a situation where the two managers are supervising di®erent agents who work
independently. Each manager determines the contract for his agent. We then vary whether
the managers' incentives are narrow (depending only on the revenue generated by their
agent) or broad (depending on the total revenue). It turns out that more narrow incentives
improve the e®ectiveness of reciprocal incentives as they better target the worker's return
gift to \his" manager. Thirdly, we consider a situation where one manager is the agent's
direct supervisor (whose compensation is highly dependent on the agent's output) and the
other is a senior manager (whose compensation is weakly dependent on the agent's output).
We consider the e®ect of having the agent's pay set centrally (by the senior manager) versus
giving the supervisor discretion over pay, i.e. having him set the contract and show that the
manager whose pay is more dependent on the agent's performance should be responsible for
setting pay.
Summing up, the results of our model suggest that, if a ¯rm uses reciprocal incentives
as a part of its incentive package, several parts of the ¯rm's personnel policy should be
coordinated to maximize the e®ectiveness of reciprocal incentives. We take this prediction
and compare it to the data features of the 1998 wave of the WERS UK data set8 which
includes information on hierarchies, the use of explicit incentives and the use of personality
tests. We interpret the use of personality (instead or in addition to ability) tests as a sign
of ¯rms screening for reciprocal workers (or at least identifying ¯rms likely to have highly
reciprocal workforces). This is in line with the arguments brought forward in Autor and
Scarborough (forthcoming) on the hiring practices of a large retail ¯rm and the ¯ndings
in Ashton et al (1997), Ben-Ner et al (2004), and Englmaier and Leider (2008) where it is
demonstrated that personality traits that are usually identi¯ed with personality tests like the
\Big 5 Test" are closely related to reciprocity as usually de¯ned in laboratory experiments.
We predict that in ¯rms that use personality tests (i.e. have a reciprocal workforce) there
should be a collocation of middle managers having decision rights over worker pay (i.e. the
managers are directly \sending a gift"), incentive pay for those managers (i.e. a high value
of the return gift, e®ort, to the initial sender), and °at wages (speci¯cally less usage of
incentive pay) for workers, implying that reciprocity is substituting for monetary incentives.
Note that this prediction for °at wages is quite conservative: we can only distinguish in
the data ¯rms completely substituting away from monetary incentives, rather than a partial
reduction in the magnitude of monetary incentives (which would also be consistent with our
8For information on the WERS see:
http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/wers-98/index.html.
The data set is available at:
http://www.esds.ac.uk/¯ndingdata/snDescription.asp?sn=4026&key=WERS.
5model). Analyzing the cross-section of ¯rms, we ¯nd the relevant interaction with the use
of personality test to be negative and highly signi¯cant and hence con¯rming our model's
predictions.
Our suggestive evidence connecting gift exchange with organizational structure indicates
a new direction for research in the growing empirical literature on gift exchange in the ¯eld.
For example Falk (2007) documents an increase in donations if solicitation letters include a
present for potential donors and Leuven et al (2005) provide survey evidence that ¯rms with
a more reciprocal work force are more likely to provide their workers with general training (as
they deem it more likely that this gift will be repaid within an ongoing relation). However,
Gneezy and List (2006) ran a ¯eld experiment hiring students for a day job and ¯nd that the
e®ect of gift exchange in the ¯eld is only minor, fast disappearing and overall not a viable
employment strategy. In contrast, Kube et al. (2006), in a setting similar to Gneezy and
List's, ¯nd weak evidence for the presence of (positive) gift exchange and strong evidence for
negative reciprocity as a response to wage cuts. Also Bellemare and Shearer (2006) analyze
gift exchange within a real tree planting ¯rm in British Columbia and ¯nd persistent e®ects of
gift exchange. Moreover they argue that spot market ¯eld experiments only establish a lower
bound of the e®ects of gift exchange in real ¯rms that are characterized by longstanding and
ongoing relations that amplify the e®ects. Finally, Dohmen et al. (2008) provide detailed
survey evidence from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the prevalence of
reciprocity on a representative level. They ¯nd substantial heterogeneity in the degree of
reciprocity, measured by the participants' response to six di®erent survey questions. They
distinguish between positive, which is the focus of our analysis, and negative reciprocity.
They proxy e®ort with measures of working hours and overtime hours and ¯nd that positively
reciprocal workers exert more of both. Moreover they ¯nd that positively reciprocal people
are less likely to be unemployed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out and analyzes
our contracting model, the following section 3 starts with the description of an extended
version of our contracting model and takes it to the WERS data. Section 4 concludes. The
Appendix contains proofs and tables.
62 The Baseline Model
2.1 Model Set Up
We begin by considering a moral hazard model with one risk neutral principal who wants to
maximize expected pro¯ts and one risk averse agent who cares about reciprocity. We assume
that there are n states of the world that are characterized by outputs qi with i = 1;:::;n
respectively. The agent can take one of two actions9 (e®ort levels) a1 and a2 with a1 < a2
and corresponding costs from e®ort c(¢) with c(a2) > c(a1): The two actions imply respective





¼i(a1)qi holds. As is standard, we assume that the monotone




¼i(a1) for all j > i: Hence higher
states are better signals of high e®ort.
A contract (wi;^ a) is a set of wage payments w(qi) in each state, as well as a (non-binding)
request for an action ^ a. In a real world context we could think of ^ a as an informal job
description or a code of conduct. While ^ a is not enforceable, it serves to ¯x the agent's
beliefs about the principal's intended generosity (since the expected utility of a contract
depends on the agent's action).
The agent's inherent concern for reciprocity is measured by ´ 2 [0;+1). The agent's














We assume that u(¢) is a real-valued, continuous, strictly increasing, concave function de¯ned
on some open interval (u(w);1) where w is ¯nite, and limw!w u(w) = ¡1.
The utility function consists of three parts10:
i) expected utility from the monetary wage payment
P
¼i (a0)u(w(qi)):
9We address the multi-action case in Appendix 5.6
10Compare this with Rabin's (1993) initially suggested reciprocal utility function. Rabin (1993, pp. 1286-
7) writes the expected utility function for player i as
Ui(ai;bj;ci) = ui(ai;bj) + ~ fj(bj;ci)[1 + fi(ai;bj)];
where ui(ai;bj) is the monetary payo® to player i, ~ fj(bj;ci) is player i's belief about how kind player j is
being to him, and fi(ai;bj) is how kind player i is being to player j (relative to a benchmark taken to be the
average of the highest and lowest possible payo®s). Thus negative reciprocity ( ~ fj < 0 and fi < ¡1) as well
as positive reciprocity increases utility.
7ii) reciprocal utility ´ (
P
¼i(^ a)u(w(qi)) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ u0)(
P
¼i (a0)qi):
iii) e®ort costs c(a0):
Hence a \generous" contract is one that provides a rent to the agent, i.e. an expected
monetary utility in excess of the agent's outside option. A more generous contract (i.e. one
that provides a larger rent) will induce the agent to feel more reciprocal, which here means
that he will derive greater marginal and absolute utility from the principal's revenue.11
We follow the approach of Grossman and Hart (1983) and focus on the implementation
problem for a particular action and do not consider the second stage problem of choosing
the optimal action, which is generally intractable for more than two actions. In the two
action case we focus on implementing a2, as a1 can be implemented trivially. The principal's





s.t. [IR] U (a2;^ a) ¸ ¹ u [IC] U (a2;^ a) ¸ U (a1;^ a) [EB] ^ a = a2
The ¯rst and second constraints are the standard individual rationality [IR]12 and incentive
compatibility [IC] constraints. The third constraint requires that beliefs are in equilibrium
[EB], i.e. that it is proper for the agent to interpret the intended kindness of the principal's
contract o®er as his expected rent under action ^ a. E®ectively, [EB] is an equilibrium selection
assumption where we are making a substantive restriction (each contract maps to one belief
- ruling out babbling equilibria) and a wlog restriction (equating the belief induced to the
actual communication). The [IC] and [EB] constraints together ensure that the principal is
asking for the action he is attempting to implement.




¼i(^ a)w(qi) s.t. U (^ a;^ a) ¸ ¹ u and U (^ a;^ a) ¸ U (a1;^ a):
Now we make the standard transformation
wi = h(u(wi)); h(¢) = u
¡1 (¢); h
0 (¢) > 0; h
00 (¢) > 0
11Note that, in order to ease exposition and to focus on our main idea, we use the principal's gross revenue,
instead of revenue net of the wage payment. We want as simply as possible capture the intuition that leaving
a rent to the agent aligns his interests to the principal's interests.
12We assume the outside option to be exogenously ¯xed. It would be interesting, though beyond the scope
of this paper, to consider endogenizing the outside option in a competitive labor market with similar ¯rms
solving simultaneously the same problem. To justify our assumption here, think of the presence of match
speci¯c capital, i.e. the worker prefers ceteris paribus for reasons not explicitly modeled here, this ¯rm over
his next best alternative.
8The following notational de¯nitions will sometimes be helpful:
ui = u(w(qi)) ER(^ a) =
X
¼i(^ a)qi





Additionally, we can transform the [IR] into a more useful form:
U (^ a;^ a) =
X
¼i(^ a)ui + ´
³X
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
ER(^ a) ¡ c(^ a) ¸ ¹ u
(1 + ´ER(^ a))
³X




¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u ¸ 0
and similarly for the [IC]
U (^ a;^ a) ¸ U (a1;^ a)
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a1))ui + ´
³X
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
(¢ER) ¸ ¢c






¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u ¸ 0
and
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a1))ui + ´
³X
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
(¢ER) ¸ ¢c
As in the standard problem, we now have a convex minimization problem with a ¯nite
number of linear inequality constraints. Therefore the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
necessary and su±cient. However, ¯rst we wish to build intuition about the principal's
problem. Examining the [IC], we can see that when the agent is reciprocal ´ > 0, the
principal has two means of providing incentives. First, the principal can provide monetary
incentives as in the standard problem. Second, the principal can provide the agent with
a positive rent, thus engendering reciprocity. The former is costly as it exposes the risk
averse agent to a risky income stream for which the agent has to be compensated with a risk
premium, while the latter involves an excess payment in order to provide the agent with a
rent. The principal's task is to mix these two incentives optimally.
2.2 Extreme Contracts
Before solving for the general optimal contract, it is useful to make the following observations
about the standard (sel¯sh-agent) contract and a °at-wage contract - two extremes in terms
of monetary and reciprocal incentives.
9Observation 1 For ´ = 0 the standard contract is optimal.







[¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a)] ¸ ¹ u and
X
[¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a)]ui ¸ ¢c







Hence our expansion of the problem to consider reciprocal agents nests the standard
problem as a special case.
Observation 2 The optimal standard contract implements ^ a for any ´.
It is well known that the optimal contract in the standard problem holds the agent down to
his outside option, EU = ¹ u. Hence the agent has zero rent, and the reciprocal portion of
his utility drops out. Therefore, since the standard contract meets the [IC] of the standard
problem, it also meets the [IC] of the full problem. This means that a reciprocal agent
who has been given zero rent acts like a sel¯sh agent. Thus if a ¯rm were to use a standard
incentive contract for its workers, even any reciprocal individuals within the workforce would
still exert e®ort. The ¯rm would not observe too-low productivity, it would merely have a
(potentially) higher-than-necessary labor cost.
More generally, we can prove the following lemma for any contract:
Lemma 1 If a contract (wi;^ a) implements ^ a for ´1, then it implements ^ a for all ´2 ¸ ´1.
Proof. It is clear that the [IR] is invariant to ´. Similarly, the RHS of the [IC] does not
vary with ´. The LHS (LHSIC = [
P
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a1))ui + ´ (
P
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(¢ER)])




¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(¢ER) ¸ 0:
Therefore, when the agent is more reciprocal the set of feasible contracts increases, and
thus the principal's agency costs are non-increasing in ´.





i) denote the value function to the principal's problem
(i.e. the expected wage bill), where u¤ is the optimal contract. Then the lemma immediately
implies
Proposition 1 V (´;¢ER;^ a) is non-increasing in ´ for all ^ a.
10Hence it will be cheaper for the principal to induce a more reciprocal agent to exert e®ort
than a less reciprocal agent. Moreover, since in the [IC] ´ is multiplied by ¢ER we can
directly conclude that increasing the value of output to the principal (i.e. increasing ¢ER)
has the same consequences.
Corollary 1 1. For any ´, if a contract (wi;^ a) implements ^ a for ¢ER1, then it implements
^ a for all ¢ER2 ¸ ¢ER1. 2. For any ´, V (´;¢ER;^ a) is non-increasing in ¢ER for all ^ a
Focusing now on the opposite extreme of a °at wage, where there are no explicit monetary
incentives, we can also easily see that reciprocal agents can still be induced to work hard.
Thus reciprocal motivations are a separate lever to provide incentives and can be su±cient
on their own.
Observation 3 For ´ > 0 a °at wage with a large enough rent ~ u will implement ^ a.
Consider ui = ¹ u + c(^ a) + ~ u for all i, where ~ u > 0. Since we assume a positive rent, the
[IR] will be met. Consider the [IC]:
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a))ui + ´
hX
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
i
(¢ER) ¸ ¢c
(¹ u + c(^ a) + ~ u)
³X




¼i(^ a)(¹ u + c(^ a) + ~ u) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
i
(¢ER) ¸ ¢c
´ (~ u)(¢ER) ¸ ¢c
Clearly the [IC] can be met for ~ u large enough: ~ u ¸ ¢c
´¢ER. Thus, if agents are su±ciently
reciprocal, a ¯rm can still induce e®ort even if contracts are completely invariant w.r.t.
signals of good performance. In fact, for very reciprocal agents the principal can induce
e®ort quite cheaply, approaching the ¯rst best implementation cost.
Observation 4 For ´ ! 1 the First Best is arbitrarily closely approximated with a °at
wage with an in¯nitesimal rent.
From equation (2.2) above, it is clear that as ´ increases, the rent needed to induce the
agent to exert e®ort decreases. In particular, in the limit the rent needed is zero. Hence the
principal's cost to implement ^ a is merely the outside option plus the cost of e®ort, equal to
the First Best cost.
112.3 The Optimal Contract
Returning to the Principal's full problem, we can now form the Lagrangian and solve for the
optimal ui.
The First Order Condition for ui in the principal's problem is given by
0 =¼i(^ a)h
0 (ui) ¡ ¸IR¼i(^ a) ¡ ¸IC [¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a) + ´¼i(^ a)(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a))]
h





+ ´ (ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a))
¸
:
with complementary slackness ¸IR ¤ [IR] = 0 and ¸IC ¤ [IC] = 0 with [IR] and [IC]
denoting the [IR] and [IC] constraints respectively. For further analysis the following lemma
will be helpful.
Lemma 2 IC binds at the optimum for all ´.
Proof. First suppose the [IC] and the [IR] are both slack. Then an alternative contract
u0
i = ui ¡² will still meet the [IR] and [IC] for small enough ², yet cost the principal strictly
less. Next, suppose the [IC] is slack, but the [IR] binds. In this case, the contract provides
no rent to the agent, hence the reciprocal portion of his utility drops out. Therefore the
agent acts like a sel¯sh agent, and the logic from the standard problem carries through: if
the [IC] were slack the FOC's would imply a °at wage, however a °at wage does not provide
any monetary incentives to exert e®ort - violating the [IC]. Therefore the [IC] must bind for
all ´.
Hence there are two classes of optima that we must consider:
1) Contracts where both the [IC] and the [IR] bind.
2) Contracts where the [IC] binds and the [IR] is slack.
To show that the latter case is relevant, we can also directly prove that for ´ su±ciently
large, the optimal contract will provide the agent with a rent.
Proposition 2 There exists a ¯nite ´¤ such that for all ´ · ´¤ the optimal contract is
a standard contract (i.e. provides zero rent) and for all ´ > ´¤ the optimal contract is a
reciprocity contract (i.e. provides the agent with a strictly positive rent).
The full proof is in Appendix 5.1, however we can easily demonstrate that for some param-
eter range a reciprocity contract is optimal, and thus provide an upper limit for ´¤. Since the
12standard contract (and its cost to the principal) is invariant to ´, to show that a reciprocity
contract is sometimes optimal it is su±cient to show that some (non-optimal) reciprocity
contract implements ^ a at lower cost to the principal. Let ust be the standard contract, and
let ~ w =
P
¼i(^ a)h(ust;i) be the principal's expected cost for the standard contract. Consider
the °at wage ui = u( ~ w ¡ ²) = ~ u for some small ². Clearly, this contract has strictly lower
cost for the principal. If ² is small enough, this °at wage will still satisfy the [IR] and provide
the agent with a positive rent (since the agent is risk averse). Moreover, it will satisfy the
[IC] if
´ (~ u ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(¢ER) ¸ ¢c , ´ ¸
¢c
(~ u ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(¢ER)
:
The right hand side is ¯nite, hence for su±ciently large, but ¯nite, ´ the °at wage ~ u imple-
ments ^ a for strictly lower cost to the principal. Therefore the optimal positive-rent contract
will have strictly lower cost than the optimal zero-rent contract (i.e. the standard contract),
hence the optimal contract will be a reciprocity contract.
Having demonstrated that there is an open set of parameters such that a reciprocity
contract is optimal, we can proceed to describe its characteristics. Indeed, the reciprocity
contract is su±ciently tractable that we can describe a number of its features, and even
explicitly solve for the optimal contract for two general classes of utility functions.






¼i(^ a) + ´¢ER
1 ¡
¼j(a1)
¼j(^ a) + ´¢ER
:
Proof. We solve for the optimal contract by setting ¸IR = 0 (since we know that for ´ > ´¤





¼i(^ a) + ´¢ER
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Hence the ratio of the marginal utilities between two states, and thus the incentive intensity,
depends on the ratio of their likelihood ratios as well as a constant denoting the marginal
impact on reciprocity of increasing the rent.
In the Appendices 5.2 and 5.3 we derive the exact form of the optimal contract for the
classes of CRRA and CARA utility, respectively. Additionally, we will refer to the cases of
CRRA and CARA utility speci¯cally in the comparative statics sections below as the results
there are very easily interpretable in terms of wage ratios and wage di®erences instead of
the somewhat abstract marginal utilities ratios in the general case.
13Since we can identify features of the optimal contract without solving explicitly for ¸IC, we
can derive general results for the optimal contract. Our guiding intuition is that the principal
is mixing optimally between two incentive mechanisms - explicit monetary incentives (which
depend on the wage spread across states, but not the wage level) and reciprocal incentives
(which depend on the overall wage level, but not directly on the spread). Therefore, we
would expect that as one incentive mechanism becomes more cost-e±cient, the principal
should use it relatively more.
2.4 Comparative Statics: Reciprocity
We should expect that as the agent gets more reciprocal, and thus it takes a smaller rent
to induce any given e®ort, the principal should use reciprocal incentives more relative to
explicit incentives. Indeed, we ¯nd that as the agent becomes more reciprocal, the optimal
contract gets °atter between states, in marginal utilities (for the general optimal contract)
and therefore also in wage levels (for CRRA and CARA utility).
Proposition 4 1. For ´ > ´¤, in the optimal contract
u0(wj)
u0(wi) is decreasing in ´ for all (i;j)
where i > j, with lim´!1
u0(wj)
u0(wi) = 1
2. For CRRA utility,
wi
wj is decreasing in ´, with lim´!1
wi
wj = 1
3. For CARA utility, (wi ¡ wj) is decreasing in ´, with lim´!1 wi ¡ wj = 0
Proof. 1. We can simply take the derivative of the marginal utility ratios, since they do
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xj: Therefore the ¯rst









u0(xi) i® (wi ¡ wj) ¸
(xi ¡ xj): Therefore the ¯rst claim implies the third claim for CARA utility.
Since the rent needed to induce e®ort gets smaller as the agent gets more reciprocal, the
cost of reciprocal incentives decreases. Therefore in the optimal contract the principal substi-
tutes away from explicit incentives (since they are now relatively more expensive compared
to reciprocal incentives).
We can also directly prove that increasing the value of the agent's e®ort similarly leads to
weaker incentives. Thus, making the return \gift" of e®ort more valuable to the principal
(for the same cost of e®ort) increases the agent's willingness to work hard in exactly the
same way as making him intrinsically more reciprocal.
Corollary 2 1. For ´ > ´¤,
u0(wj)
u0(wi) is decreasing in ¢ER, with lim¢ER!1
u0(wj)
u0(wi) = 1
2. For CRRA utility,
wi
wj is decreasing in ¢ER, with lim¢ER!1
wi
wj = 1
3. For CARA utility, wi ¡ wj is decreasing in ¢ER, with lim¢ER!1 wi ¡ wj = 0
Proof. Note that in the above equations, ´ always appears as ´¢ER, hence an increase in
¢ER is equivalent to an increase in ´.
2.5 Comparative Statics: Information
We can also demonstrate that when output is a more informative signal of e®ort, contracts
use more explicit incentives. We are unaware of any other papers in the literature that are
able to examine directly the strength of incentives between states as the information structure
changes. We begin by developing some notation to allow us to compare the incentives of two
contracts.
Let w and x be two contracts specifying wage payments in states i = 1;:::;n:
De¯nition 1 De¯ne the partial order over contracts w Âmu x; \w implies sharper marginal




u0(xi)8i ¸ ~ i;j · ~ j with
strictness for all (i0;j) and (i;j0).
This relation requires that for some set of \high" states and some set of \low" states, the
ratio of marginal utilities for any high state and any low state is higher in w than in x, and
strict for at least one high state and one low state. Thus the \sharper" contract provides
15greater rewards for achieving high output states relative to low output states. For example
increasing the bonus size for a step-function bonus, or increasing the commission rate for a
commission with a sales-hurdle makes the monetary incentives \sharper".
Note that Âmu is transitive, if w Âmu x for (~ i1; ~ j1) and x Âmu y for (~ i2; ~ j2) , then w Âmu y
for (~ i;~ j) =
¡
max
£~ i1; ~ i2
¤
;min
£~ j1; ~ j2
¤¢





2]. Note also that if w Âmu x for some
¡
i0
1; ~ i1; ~ j1;j0
1
¢
then you cannot have
w Âmu x for some other
¡
i0














In some cases we will be able to make stronger comparisons between contracts, such that
every state is either a high state or a low state.
De¯nition 2 De¯ne the partial order w Âmu;~ k x; \w has sharper marginal utilities
about state ~ k than x" if w Âmu x for ~ i = ~ k and ~ j = ~ i ¡ 1: Again, note that Âmu;~ k is
transitive holding ~ k ¯xed.
As with the previous comparative static, for CRRA and CARA utilities the general relation
for marginal utilities will imply a relation for ratio and di®erence (respectively) of wage levels:
\sharper" contracts give a larger increase in wages between low output states and high output
states.
De¯nition 3 De¯ne the partial order over contracts w Âwr x; \w has sharper wage




xj8i ¸ ~ i;j · ~ j with
strictness for all (i0;j) and (i;j0):
De¯nition 4 De¯ne the partial order w Âwr;~ k x; 'w has sharper wage ratios about
state ~ k than x' if w Âwr x for ~ i = ~ k and ~ j = ~ i ¡ 1:
De¯nition 5 De¯ne the partial order over contracts w Âwd x; 'w has sharper wage dif-
ferences in the extremes than x' if 9i0 ¸ ~ i > ~ j ¸ j0 s.t. wi ¡ wj ¸ xi ¡ xj8i ¸ ~ i;j · ~ j
with strictness for all (i0;j) and (i;j0):
De¯nition 6 De¯ne the partial order w Âwd;~ k x; 'w has sharper wage di®erences about
state ~ k than x' if w Âwd x for ~ i = ~ k and ~ j = ~ i ¡ 1:
Lemma 3 If u(¢) is CRRA then Âmu and Âwr are equivalent. If u(¢) is CARA then Âmu



























u0(xi) i® (wi ¡ wj) ¸
(xi ¡ xj):
Having developed a concept to compare incentive intensity across contracts, we also need
to specify in what sense the principal's information \improves". We focus on the standard
comparison in the literature: that the likelihood ratios of one information structure are a
mean preserving spread of the other information structure.13
Let ¦F and ¦G be two discrete probability distributions over the states, where the likeli-
hood ratios for implementing ^ a are distributed according to F and G respectively.
From Kim (1995) G is a mean preserving spread of F if F and G have the same means
and
R y G(t)dt ¸
R y F(t)dt for all y 2 < and strict for some range with positive measure.




















From Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970), we can focus on the step function S(x) = G(x) ¡ F(x);
and the corresponding step function s(zk) = gk ¡ fk:
Additionally, if we restrict attention to a speci¯c class of mean-preserving spreads, we will
be able to make stronger comparisons between contracts.
De¯nition 7 G di®ers from F via a balanced MPS if 9¸ x s.t. S(x) ¸ 0 for x < ¸ x and
S(x) · 0 for x > ¸ x: Let ¸ i be the highest state with a likelihood ratio less than or equal to ¸ x:
Hence in a balanced MPS, the likelihood ratios for all states with a likelihood ratio smaller
than ¸ x do not increase, while the likelihood ratios for all the states with a likelihood ratio
larger than ¸ x do not decrease. Increasing the variance of a normal distribution is an example
of a balanced MPS.
Additionally, we will want to break apart the di®erence in the distributions into a number
of individual changes. From Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), we say G di®ers from F by a
single MPS if gk = fk except for four states (denoted 1 to 4 for simplicity with z1 < z2 <
z3 < z4) and g1 ¡ f1 = ¡(g2 ¡ f2) ¸ 0;g4 ¡ f4 = ¡(g3 ¡ f3) ¸ 0 and
P4
k=1 zk (gk ¡ fk) = 0
Let ± = z2 ¡ z1 and ± = z4 ¡ z3 (i.e. the change in the likelihood ratios).
13Cf. eg. Kim (1995).
17For these simple changes in information, we can easily show that, if both optimal contracts
are reciprocity contracts, the contract under the better information structure will be sharper
in marginal utilities in the extremes.
Lemma 4 If G di®ers from F by only a single MPS, w¤(G);x¤(F) are the optimal contracts
given the distribution of likelihood ratios, and ´ ¸ max[´¤(F);´¤(G)] then w¤(G) Âmu x¤(F):
Proof. See Appendix 5.4
Using the Rothschild-Stiglitz result that an MPS can be deconstructed into a sequence of
single MPS's, we can show that
Proposition 5 If G is an MPS of F, w¤(G);x¤(F) are the optimal contracts given the distri-
bution of likelihood ratios, and ´ ¸ max[´¤(F);´¤(G)] then w¤(G) Âmu x¤(F): Additionally,
if G is a balanced MPS of F, then w¤(G) Âmu;¸ i x¤(F):
Proof. See Appendix 5.5
As output becomes a more informative signal about e®ort this means that the agent
taking the high e®ort action makes it increasingly more likely that a high output state is
obtained rather than a low output state. The optimal contract exploits this by increasing
the (relative) reward in high states and decreasing the (relative) reward in low states, i.e. the
optimal contract provides \sharper" monetary incentives. For the cases of CRRA and CARA
utility, the corresponding results for wage ratios and wage di®erences follow immediately.
Corollary 3 If G is an MPS of F and w¤(G);x¤(F) are both reciprocity contracts, then
w¤(G) Âwr x¤(F) if u(¢) is CRRA and w¤(G) Âwd x¤(F) if u(¢) is CARA. Additionally, if
G is a balanced MPS of F, then w¤(G) Âwr;¸ i x¤ if u(¢) is CRRA and w¤(G) Âwd;¸ i x¤(F) if
u(¢) is CARA.
Proof. Apply Lemma 3.
Thus as the output realization becomes a better signal of e®ort, the optimal contract uses
more explicit incentives, in the sense of larger changes in either marginal utility or wages
between low output and high output states.
182.6 Multiple Action Case
In Appendix 5.6 we show how our results extend to the case of multiple action levels for the
agent. We show that without any further distributional assumptions Observations 1 through
4 directly extend to the multiple action case. We can also show that the principal's value
function is non-increasing in ´, that a downward [IC] always binds and hence the principal
does not provide excessive incentives, and that for su±ciently high values of ´ a reciprocity
contract is indeed the optimal contract. Furthermore we show that if we assume CDFC,
introduced by Rogerson (1985), all our results, including the comparative statics, extend to
the multi action case.
3 The Extended Model
3.1 A Model of Organizational Structure
A problem with most of the behavioral contracting models (and with optimal contracting
models more generally), is a relative scarcity of empirically falsi¯able predictions. Results
depend on hard to observe variables (preference parameters, stochastic properties of the
problem, costs to monitor, ...) and not even data on all predictions (incentive intensity,
details of the contract, ...) are readily accessible to the researcher.
Our basic model is not di®erent in this respect. Results also depend on hard to observe
parameters like ´, the e®ect of agent's e®ort on the principal's payo®, or the stochastic prop-
erties of the problem. However, our model can be extended to allow us to make predictions
about properties of organizational structure. Our baseline model assumes that either the
principal is a single individual, or if the principal is a ¯rm that the agent feels reciprocal to
the ¯rm as a whole. However, rather than treating the ¯rm as a monolith, the agent could
have di®erent reciprocal feelings towards particular individuals on the ¯rm side. In particu-
lar it seems reasonable to suppose that an individual may give more \credit" for kindness to
the particular manager that sets his pay. Moreover, Co®man and Bazerman (2008) ¯nd that
individuals place the majority of the blame for unkind actions on the speci¯c individual who
ultimately made the decision, even when the previous actions of another person restricted
his choice set. If the agent feels more reciprocal towards particular individuals within the
¯rm, then the compensation setting and decision making features of the organization will
a®ect the impact of reciprocal sentiments. If the ¯rm decides to make use of reciprocal
19incentives, speci¯c properties of the organizational structure like the allocation of decision
rights over pay (\who gives the gift") or the use of performance pay across the hierarchy can
be adjusted to give reciprocal incentives the most leverage.
To see this, consider the following stylized model. There are two risk neutral managers,
I and II, whose payo®s are (di®erent) monotonic functions of ¯rm revenue (fI(ER) and
fII(ER) respectively). For simplicity we assume that only one manager takes an action
that is payo® relevant to the agent, and that the agent gives all of the \credit" for rent
he receives to the manager who took the action14. Since we are focusing on the agency
problem of the reciprocal agent, we assume that whichever manager takes an action will set
the agent's contract to maximize overall ¯rm pro¯t. In particular, we will consider three
simple organizational relationships between I and II to illustrate the role of managerial
compensation and decision-making for the reciprocity of subordinates:
² I is the ¯rm owner and II a manager. The manager determines the agent's contract,
while the owner takes no action. We then vary the strength of the manager's incentives.
² I and II are managers of di®erent agents (who work independently). Each manager
determines the contract for his agent. We then vary whether the managers' incen-
tives are narrow (depending only on the revenue generated by their agent) or broad
(depending on the total revenue).
² I is the agent's direct supervisor (whose compensation is highly dependant on the
agent's output) and II is a senior manager (whose compensation is weakly dependent
on the agent's output). We consider the e®ect of having the agent's pay set centrally
(by II) versus giving the supervisor discretion over pay (i.e. I sets the contract).
Let Dk = 1 if manager k determines the agent's contract, for k 2 fI;IIg
= 0 otherwise
Furthermore we assume that the agent's preference intensity for reciprocity is person-independent,
i.e. ´ is constant for managers I and II. Then we can write the agent's preferences as follows:
U (a;^ a) =
X











¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a)¹ u
´i
(fII (ER(a))):
14It would be su±cient to generate the following results to instead assume that the decision of one manager
has a larger impact on the agent's payo® than the other manager, and that the agent assigns a larger fraction
of the perceived kindness to the manager whose action was relatively more important. The simpler model
we consider in the text is the limit version of this assumption.
20For simplicity we focus on the two action case where ´ > ´¤, i.e. a reciprocity contract is
optimal. We also abstract away from agency problems at the managerial level; we assume
that all managers set the agent's pay optimally with respect to the ¯rm's overall objective
function.
3.1.1 Strength of Managerial Incentives
We ¯rst consider the case where principal I is the owner of the ¯rm and principal II is
the manager. We assume that the manager sets the agent's pay while the owner takes
no action (i.e. DI = 0 and DII = 1). To have a simple metric for the strength of the
manager's incentives, we assume that the owner and the manager split the revenue via a
linear compensation scheme:
fII(ER) = ® + ¯ ¤ ER(a) fI(ER) = (1 ¡ ¯) ¤ ER(a) ¡ ®
Hence the manager will have stronger incentives when ¯ is larger. It is straightforward
to show that reciprocity will have a stronger incentive e®ect for the agent when ¯ is larger,
and therefore the costs of agency will be smaller. Let V (´;¯) denote the value function at
the optimum of the principal's problem given the manager's incentives.
Proposition 6 For a given ´ > ´¤(¯), V (´;¯) is decreasing in ¯.
Proof. Since DI = 0, the reciprocity terms relating to the owner drop out of the agent's
utility. Therefore, this model is isomorphic to the base model, replacing ER(a) with ® +
¯ ¤ ER(a), and therefore replacing ¢ER with ¯ ¤ ¢ER. Note that ® cancels - the agent
only cares about the change in the manager's payo® due to e®ort, not the absolute level.
Therefore increasing ¯ is equivalent to increasing ¢ER, and thus the set of implementable
contracts increase (since reciprocal incentives are stronger) and therefore the costs of agency
decrease. This holds even if ® depends on ¯, since V is invariant to ®.
Additionally, the comparative static for reciprocity also extends.
Corollary 4 1. For ´ > ´¤(¯),
u0(wj)
u0(wi) is decreasing in ¯ for all i > j.
2. For CRRA utility,
wi
wj is decreasing in ¯ for all i > j.
3. For CARA utility, wi ¡ wj is decreasing in ¯ for all i > j.
21Since the manager is the only principal that factors into the agent's reciprocity, increasing
the strength of his incentives makes the agent's e®ort more valuable to him, and therefore for
any amount of rent the agent is more willing to exert e®ort. Thus at the optimum the agent's
explicit monetary incentives will be weaker when the manager's incentives are stronger.
3.1.2 Breadth of Managerial Incentives
We now consider the case where managers I and II are division managers - each oversees an
agent who works independently and generates separate output ERI and ERII. We assume
the two agents are identical. Each manager determines the contract for his agent. We
consider two kinds of incentives for the managers: narrow incentives where each manager is
compensated for the output of his worker, and broad incentives where both managers are
compensated for the total output of both workers.
Case 1 (Broad incentives) fk(ERI;ERII) =
ERI+ERII
2
Case 2 (Narrow incentives) fk(ERI;ERII) = ERk.
Since the agents' outputs are independent we focus without loss of generality on the agency
problem for agent II. For this agent we then have that manager II is the only manager
who makes a payo®-relevant decision (i.e. DI = 0 and DII = 1). Therefore the reciprocity
term for manager I drops out of the agent's utility function. Thus, broadening managerial
incentives decreases the impact that high e®ort will have on the payo® of the manager that
the agent feels reciprocal towards. Therefore, the reciprocal sentiments of the agent will have
greatest impact when managerial incentives are narrow. Let Vi(´) denote the value function
of the principal's problem in Case 1.
Proposition 7 For a given ´ > max(´¤
1;´¤
2) and for any contract for the other agent,
V1(´) > V2(´).
Proof. Let ERI(^ aI) denote the expected revenue given the action of agent I. Then Case 2
is equivalent to setting ® = 0 and ¯ = 1 in the previous model, while Case 1 is equivalent to
setting ® =
ERI(^ aI)
2 and ¯ = 1
2. Since V is decreasing in ¯, the result follows immediately.
Since broader incentives are less responsive to the agent's e®ort, the agent is less able to
return the principal's kindness when he has broad incentives. Therefore, reciprocal incentives
are less e®ective. Similarly, the optimal monetary incentives for the agent will be weaker
when the manager's incentives are narrower.




u0(wi) is smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1 for all
i > j.
2. For CRRA utility,
wi
wj is smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1 for all i > j.
3. For CARA utility, wi ¡ wj is smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1 for all i > j.
3.1.3 Managerial Discretion
Lastly, we consider the role of the decision rights over the agent's pay. To that end we
compare the case where the agent's compensation is determined centrally by a senior manager
I (e.g. by the HR department, by a ¯rm wide compensation policy, etc.) or where the agent's
supervisor II has discretion over the agent's pay. To capture this di®erence we distinguish
I and II by the responsiveness of their payo®s to this agent's output. We assume that the
supervisor's payo®s are relatively more sensitive to an increase in output than the senior
manager who is further away in the hierarchy of the ¯rm. That is, we assume
fII(ER(^ a)) ¡ fII(ER(a1)) > fI(ER(^ a)) ¡ fI(ER(a1))
We now consider two cases:
Case 1 (Central Policy) Manager I determines the agent's contract, while manager II
takes no action.
Case 2 (Managerial Discretion) Manager II determines the agent's contract, while
manager I takes no action.
Since the payo®s of manager I are a®ected less when the agent works hard than the
payo®s of manager II, it is straightforward to show that reciprocity will be more e®ective as
an incentive for the agent when manager II sets his pay (and thus gets credit for any rents).
Proposition 8 For a given ´ > max(´¤
1;´¤
2), V1(´) > V2(´).
Proof. In each case, the reciprocity terms for the manager who doesn't make a decision
drop out of the agent's utility function, therefore each Case k is isomorphic to the base
model, replacing ¢ER with fk(ER(^ a)) ¡ fk(ER(a1)). Thus the results from the base case
immediately imply the result, since ¢ERII > ¢ERI.
Again, this also implies that the optimal monetary incentives will be weaker in Case 2
than in Case 1.




u0(wi) is smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1 for all
i > j.
2. For CRRA utility,
wi
wj is smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1 for all i > j.
3. For CARA utility, wi ¡ wj is smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1 for all i > j.
These results indicate that the organizational features of the ¯rm can signi¯cantly in°u-
ence the e®ectiveness of reciprocity as an incentive device. Taken together they suggest that
reciprocity will be most e®ective when the manager who has decision rights over the com-
pensation for the agent also has strong, narrow incentives related to the agent's productivity.
3.2 The WERS Data Set
In order to test the predictions from the extended model we use the 1998 Workplace Employee
Relations Survey (WERS 98), the fourth in a government-funded series of surveys carried
out at British workplaces. The WERS 98 has very detailed information on work practices
and organizational structure in 2191 UK workplaces in manufacturing industries with at
least 10 employees. The mean workplace size is 212 with a maximum size of 14135. 19% of
the establishments are part of the production sector. The survey covers a wide range of ¯rms
with respect to their competitive situation. While 33% have a UK market share for their
main product or service of less than 5% there are also about 15% who have a UK market
share of more than 50%.
The WERS is particularly apt for our purposes as it has information on the use and scope
of incentives throughout a ¯rm's hierarchy and on whether or not a ¯rm uses personality
tests (in addition to or instead of ability tests) in the hiring process.15 We interpret the use
of personality tests as a proxy for ¯rms screening for reciprocal workers, or more generally
that the ¯rm is likely to obtain a highly reciprocal workforce while screening for other
(correlated) traits. Our empirical approach is consistent with the results from Ashton et al
(1997), Ben-Ner et al (2004), and Englmaier and Leider (2008), who show that personality
traits that are usually identi¯ed with personality tests like the \Big 5 Test" are closely
correlated with reciprocity as commonly de¯ned in laboratory experiments. Autor and
Scarborough (forthcoming) document the hiring procedures of a large retail ¯rm, which
according to the authors are representative for the industry, that uses personality tests to
15While 59% of ¯rms use performance or competency test, only 34% use personality or attitude tests when
¯lling vacancies.
24screen workers upon hiring. The ¯rm gave hiring preference to applicants with positive
z-scores for \agreeableness", \conscientiousness", and \extroversion", Big 5 traits that are
predictive for the presence of reciprocity. Hence we assume that ¯rms that use personality
tests in their hiring procedures are more likely to hire reciprocal employees and thus make
use of reciprocal incentives in their personnel policy. Thus their organizational structure
should be more likely to be coordinated to maximize the e±ciency of reciprocal incentives.
With these ¯rms as our main focus, we can examine the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 If a ¯rm uses personality tests wages should be, ceteris paribus, higher.
This is a direct implication of our base model. If a ¯rm wants to use reciprocal incentives
it has to leave a rent to the worker by paying more generous wages. While other factors may
be correlated with both using personality tests and granting higher wages, above-market pay
for workers is a necessary starting point for the reciprocity mechanism to generate our more
speci¯c predictions.
Hypothesis 2 If a ¯rm uses personality tests and managers have incentive pay, then non-
managers are less likely to have incentive pay.
For the interpretation of this hypotheses it is important to note that the use of personality
tests and particularly the use of incentive pay for both managers and non-managers is likely
to be positively correlated. Both are features of a sophisticated human resource policy. Once
a ¯rm pays a ¯xed cost to have a specialized HR department in place, the use of personality
tests upon hiring becomes easier to implement. A high quality HR department will also
ease the design and implementation of performance based pay systems. Similarly, there is a
large ¯xed cost to establishing a monitoring and control system in order to provide managers
with performance-based incentive pay. If such a monitoring and control system is in place,
it should become relatively cheap to extend performance pay to non-managers. In order
to get beyond this (expected) \technical" positive correlation our analysis will focus on the
interaction e®ect of Personality Test £ Managers Have Variable Pay in order to isolate
the additional e®ect of using these complementary channels to improve the e®ectiveness of
reciprocal incentives, rather than the overall net probability of using incentive pay. While we
might expect personality tests, managerial incentive pay and non-managerial incentive pay
to be technological complements, our model of reciprocity predicts that personality tests
and managerial pay should in fact be (jointly) substitutes for non-managerial pay. That
is when ¯rms have su±ciently reciprocal workers and have managerial pay schemes that
allow for workers to reciprocate to their managers via hard work, ¯rms should be less likely
25to choose to provide monetary incentives to workers, since reciprocal motivations may be
su±cient. This prediction is in fact quite a conservative test of the model due to limitations
in the data. We cannot observe the magnitude of monetary incentives, only their presence.
Thus we cannot identify ¯rms who choose weaker monetary incentives, which would also be
consistent with the model, only those who chose zero monetary incentives. Since we can only
observe the most extreme substitutions towards reciprocal incentives, we do not expect to
¯nd that the average \reciprocal" ¯rm chooses not to use monetary incentives, merely that
¯rms on the margin substitute away from monetary incentives.
Hypothesis 3 If a ¯rm uses personality tests and managers have incentive pay, then man-
agers' incentives have a more narrow scope.
When a ¯rm has a workforce that is su±ciently reciprocal to make a reciprocity contract
potentially appealing, the ¯rm will have lower agency costs (for workers) when it makes
worker reciprocity more e®ective by providing managers with narrower incentive pay (i.e.
determined by the productivity of a smaller sub-unit within the ¯rm). This implies that ¯rms
that screen for reciprocal employees and that allow workers to reciprocate to their supervisors
by o®ering variable pay to managers, will also help workers to reciprocate e®ectively by not
diluting the supervisor's payo®s by adding too broad based components to the pay package.
Hypothesis 4 If a ¯rm uses personality tests and direct supervisors have discretion over
workers' pay, then non-managers are less likely to have incentive pay.
As before, because there may be technological main e®ects correlating HR policies with
worker incentive pay, we focus on the interaction term Personality Test £ Supervisors have
Decision Rights. The ¯rms where reciprocal incentives will be most e®ective at providing
motivation to exert e®ort will be ¯rms that have both reciprocal workers and have the
principal who is easiest to reciprocate towards (the direct supervisor) be the one to provide
the \gift" of high wages. Thus at the margin we should expect some ¯rms to substitute
away from explicit monetary incentives for the non-managerial workers towards reciprocal
incentives. As with Hypothesis 2, we can only make a very conservative test, since we can
only identify ¯rms who substitute completely away from monetary incentives. Hence we
only hope to ¯nd that ¯rms with both personality tests and supervisor decisions rights are
less likely to use variable pay incentives for their workers than those characteristics would
independently suggest, rather than make any prediction about the overall probability.
To check Hypothesis 1 refer to Table 1 where we run an Ordered Probit on the probability
of falling in a certain pay category. As predicted the explanatory variable Use Personality
26Test at Hiring is highly signi¯cantly positive, indicating that ¯rms that use personality
test upon hiring indeed pay higher wages. In the regression we control for various other
variables and a large number of dummies, notably for ¯rm size. We also control for the use
of performance pay, such that the higher wages associated with personality tests cannot be
attributed to a risk premium paid to the workers to compensate them for steep incentives.
However, as this is our least speci¯c prediction we do not view this as a particularly strong
test of our model, however we ¯nd it reassuring to ¯nd this basic e®ect.
Non-Manager Wages
COEFFICIENT (1)
Use Personality Test at Hiring (by Job Type) 0.221***
(0.048)
Use Competency Test at Hiring (by Job Type) 0.0699***
(0.025)
Use Pro¯t-based Pay (by Job Type) 0.000461
(0.030)
Use Performance-based Pay (by Job Type) 0.0570*
(0.031)
Use Employee Stock Ownership (by Job Type) -0.0355
(0.034)
Employee has control over Tasks 0.0912***
(0.024)
Employee has control over Pace 0.0348
(0.025)
Employee has control over How to Perform Work 0.117***
(0.032)
Weekly Hours Worked 0.186***
(0.0090)
Weekly Hours Worked2 -0.00142***
(0.000096)
Gender, Race, Job Type, Experience, Training, Education, Contract Type, Industry, Union, and Firm Size Dummies YES
Constants
$ 1 to $ 2,600 per year 1.104***
(0.21)
$ 2,601 to $ 4,160 per year 2.396***
(0.23)
$ 4,161 to $ 7,280 per year 3.826***
(0.25)
$ 7,281 to $ 9,360 per year 4.540***
(0.26)
$ 9,361 to $ 11,440 per year 5.220***
(0.26)
$ 11,441 to $ 13,520 per year 5.774***
(0.26)
$ 13,521 to $ 16,120 per year 6.310***
(0.27)
$ 16,121 to $ 18,720 per year 6.807***
(0.27)
$ 18,721 to $ 22,360 per year 7.525***
(0.27)
$ 22,361 to $ 28,080 per year 8.354***
(0.27)
$ 28,081 to $ 35,360 per year 8.991***
(0.27)
over $ 35,360 per year 10.74***
(0.34)
Observations 20350
Ordered Probit - Standard errors in parentheses
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1
Table 1: WERS - Non-Manager Wages
We run an OLS regression with interactions with Use of Variable Pay for Non-Managers
27as the independent variable, de¯ned as whether a non-managerial workers receive any sort of
performance pay, and the dependent variables Use Personality Test at Hiring and Managers
have Variable Pay. We control for the use of competency tests and include standard ¯rm
size, industry, union, and competition dummies. The key components of our speci¯cation are
however the interactions Personality Test £ Managers Have Variable Pay and Personality
Test £ Supervisors Have Decision Rights. The results are reported in Table 2.
Use of Variable Pay for Non-Managers
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Managers Have Variable Pay 0.903*** 0.904*** 0.892*** 0.888*** 0.930*** 0.935***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Use Personality Test at Hiring 0.0331 0.0587 0.0315 0.0434 0.0787 0.116*
(0.038) (0.046) (0.030) (0.035) (0.054) (0.066)
Personality Test x Managers Have Variable Pay -0.0596 -0.0981** -0.112* -0.157**
(0.041) (0.047) (0.059) (0.072)
Supervisors Have Decision Rights 0.0399* 0.0356* 0.0656** 0.0683**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031)
Personality Test x Supervisors Have Decision Rights -0.0681** -0.0881** -0.129** -0.164**
(0.034) (0.038) (0.063) (0.079)
Supervisors Have Decision Rights x Managers Variable Pay -0.0737*** -0.0856***
(0.028) (0.032)
Personality Test x Supervisors Decision Rights x Man. Var. Pay 0.149** 0.172**
(0.066) (0.085)
Controls for ¯rm size and industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use Competency Test at Hiring 0.0303* 0.0286 0.0281 0.0301 0.0249 0.0287
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Union and Competition Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.0642 0.172*** 0.0588 0.174*** 0.0469 0.157**
(0.040) (0.061) (0.042) (0.060) (0.044) (0.061)
Observations 2181 1588 2181 1588 2181 1588
R-squared 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86
OLS - Standard errors in parentheses
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1
Omitted Market Competition: Very High
Omitted Number Competitors: None
Decision Rights = Supervisors Recruit Workers or Set Worker Pay
Variable Pay = ESOPs, Pro¯t-based Payments/Bonuses or Indiv/Team Ouput-based Payments/Bonuses
Table 2: WERS - Use of Variable Pay for Non-Managers
Con¯rming Hypotheses 2 and 4 we ¯nd that both interactions Personality Test £ Man-
agers Have Variable Pay and Personality Test £ Supervisors Have Decision Rights are
negative and signi¯cant on the 5% level in the relevant speci¯cations 2 and 4.16 Thus ¯rms
who use personality tests and have variable pay for managers are approximately 10% less
likely to use variable pay for non-managers than one would expect given the main e®ects of
those variables. Similarly, ¯rms who use personality tests and give supervisor decision rights
over pay are approximately 10% less likely to use variable pay for non-managers.
16For speci¯cations 3 and 4, we de¯ne a supervisor as having decision rights if the ¯rm reports that
supervisors recruit workers for hiring or set workers' pay. The results are robust to an alternate speci¯cation
where we say a supervisor has decision rights if he does any of the following: recruit workers for hiring, sets
worker pay, determines the pay scheme, or evaluates workers.
28Speci¯cation 5 and 6 in Table 2 have interactions for Personality Tests, Managers Have
Variable Pay and Supervisors Have Decision Rights in combination. The two-way interac-
tions with Personality Tests are both negative, and the sum of all the two-way plus the
three way interactions is ¡0:234 (p < 0:003). Moreover, if managers do not have variable
pay, the joint e®ect of adding Personality Tests and Supervisors Have Decision Rights is
approximately zero and non-signi¯cant. However, if Managers Have Variable Pay is true,
the overall e®ect of adding Personality Tests and Supervisors Have Decision Rights is ¡0:05
(p < 0:001). So while the technological main e®ect of Managers Have Variable Pay is too
large to be completely overturned, we can show that the total e®ect of the other two vari-
ables is net negative, and the net negative e®ect is only present when managers have variable
pay (as one would expect from our model). That is, conditional on giving variable pay to
managers, ¯rms with both personality tests at hiring and decision rights for supervisors are
5% less likely overall to give non-managers variable pay than ¯rms that have neither.
To con¯rm Hypothesis 3 we run an Ordered Probit Estimation. The dependent variable
here is \Organizational Scope of Pro¯t-Based Pay", a categorical variable de¯ned as 1 = By
Workplace, 2 = By Division/Subsidiary, and 3 = For the Whole Company and capturing on
what organizational unit the pro¯t related pay components are calculated. We control for
the use of competency tests, standard ¯rm size, industry, union, and competition dummies.
Key to our speci¯cation is the interaction Use of Personality Test £ Managers have Variable
Pay.
Organizational Scope of Pro¯t-Based Pay
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3)
Managers Have Variable Pay 0.764* 0.220 0.220
(0.41) (0.44) (0.44)
Use Personality Test at Hiring 1.140* 2.129** 2.129**
(0.66) (0.85) (0.85)
Pers. Test x Man. Var. Pay -0.919 -1.977** -1.977**
(0.70) (0.90) (0.90)
Use Competency Test at Hiring 0.253 0.151 0.151
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
SIC - Education 9.101*** 9.998***
(0.39) (0.54)
Union and Competition Dummies No Yes Yes
Constants
By Division/Subsidiary 1.861*** 1.222 1.222
(0.68) (0.92) (0.92)
For the Whole Company 2.188*** 1.602* 1.602*
(0.67) (0.92) (0.92)
Observations 673 550 546
Note: Foreign Owned is dropped due to no nonzero observations (given other missing values)
Note: Speci¯cation (3) excludes four observations reported as fully
determined in speci¯cation (2) to verify the validity of the standard errors
\For what part of your organisation is the amount of pro¯t-related pay calculated?"
1 = By Workplace; 2 = By Division/Subsidiary; 3 = For the Whole Company
Ordered Probit - Standard errors in parentheses
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1
Table 3: WERS - Organizational Scope
29Inspecting Table 3 con¯rms our Hypothesis 3. The scope of managerial incentives is the
dependent variable and we ¯nd that the interaction Use of Personality Test £ Managers
have Variable Pay is negative and signi¯cant on the 5% level in the relevant speci¯cation
with controls, i.e. a ¯rm is less likely to have broadly de¯ned performance pay if it screens
for reciprocal types and managers' pay depends on their workers' output.
3.3 Discussion
Since we only have cross-sectional data and data limitations restrict us to very conservative
tests of the model, we are obviously not claiming to establish causality. However, it is
noteworthy that we ¯nd our quite subtle predictions on the interaction e®ects consistently
in the data. Furthermore, to our knowledge, these patterns of the data were not previously
known or studied nor was our theoretical model tailored to generate them. To the contrary,
only our theoretical analysis led us to check for these interaction e®ects.
As noted above, an alternative hypothesis to explain our results could be that the use
of personality tests and managerial incentive pay are signs of ¯rms with more sophisticated
personnel policies. Indeed, the use of these policies is strongly correlated with ¯rm size.
However, if sophistication was the sole determinant, we would expect, if anything, that more
sophisticated ¯rms are more (rather than less) likely to use incentives also for non-managers.
Managerial incentives would already necessitate the collection of performance measures,
lowering the marginal cost of extending these monetary incentives to non-managers. The
WERS provides us with two variables which we can arguably use as proxies for sophisticated
personnel policies: We know the number of sta® dealing speci¯cally with personnel issues in
the workplace and we know whether there is an equal opportunity or diversity management
policy in place in the workplace. Including these proxies (separately or jointly) in our
regressions neither qualitatively nor quantitatively change our results. If anything the size
of the relevant interaction e®ects increases. Hence our regression results are qualitatively
and quantitatively robust to including these two (admittedly crude) measures of personnel
policy sophistication.
Misaligned performance measures, a prominent explanation for the lack of explicit in-
centives, would not imply a variation with respect to ¯nding workers of the appropriate
preference type. Therefore, while we might have expected a main e®ect, it cannot explain
a signi¯cant interaction e®ect between organizational structure and the use of personality
tests. Similarly, while intrinsic motivation could suggest an overall low level of incentives,
30again there is no reason to expect that organizational features such as the presence of man-
agerial incentives, or managerial discretion over pay, would enhance intrinsic motivation and
thus can explain the empirical result.
If ¯rms use monitoring instead of explicit incentives for workers, then we would also expect
to get our result that less variable pay for non-managers correlates with more variable pay
and more decision rights for managers, however there is no reason to expect that personality
tests should have an e®ect in a monitoring story. If ¯rms use career incentives instead of
explicit incentives for workers, we might expect a main e®ect of personality tests, as the
use of career concerns implies that workers stay with the ¯rm for longer, hence ¯t becomes
more important and personality tests are used more often. This main e®ect of personality
tests, however, is always (a) non-signi¯cant, and (b) directionally positive, i.e. more use
of personality tests correlates with more use of non-manager performance pay. Moreover,
again there is no reason to expect any systematic interaction e®ects. Using career concerns
as an incentive device should work equally well whether a senior manager or the supervisor
is setting pay, or whether the supervisor has performance pay or not.
Our interpretation stresses the importance of a close relation between workers and their
supervisors. Collusion between those comes to mind as a potential danger to the ¯rm.
Though this is certainly an important and valid concern, empirically a collusion story would
suggest that giving strong incentives not only to managers but also workers is important
and would hence predict a positive interaction e®ect. Finally our assumption that the use
of personality tests upon hiring leads to a more reciprocal workforce, though implied by
Autor and Scarborough (forthcoming), can be scrutinized. How can we rule out that ¯rms
in fact do not use personality tests to speci¯cally select sel¯sh workers? Note, if (some) ¯rms
screen in a way that leads to more sel¯sh workers being hired, then we should not expect
them to use reciprocal incentives, as they would be doomed to fail. Hence our estimates
underestimate the true e®ect within ¯rms that select reciprocal workers and use reciprocal
incentives.
Unconditional forms of social preferences based on distributions, such as pure altruism
or inequity aversion, may suggest that the allocation of rents to a manager via managerial
incentives could a®ect the e®ort decision of a non-managerial worker. However, these models
all depend purely on the payo® outcomes, not on who takes any particular action nor on
their intentions. Therefore these models cannot explain the interaction e®ect with managerial
decision making. Thus, though we do not want to over-interpret our ¯ndings, we ¯nd the
results to be suggestive and hard to explain with alternative stories, hence lending support
31to our interpretation.
4 Conclusion
The importance of fairness and social preferences especially for the work relation has long
been documented. We focus on reciprocity, a widely studied form of social preferences, par-
ticularly in the experimental literature. Despite its prominence in experimental economics,
there is so far no theoretical analysis of how exactly reciprocity a®ects the employment rela-
tion in the presence of moral hazard. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-
agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based pay are
substitutes, and that using reciprocal incentives decreases agency costs. Furthermore, we
show that the optimal contract entails an optimal mix of both incentive forms: using explicit
incentives less when the agent is more reciprocal, and using them more when output is a
more informative signal of e®ort. Our results highlight the importance of the magnitude of
the bene¯t to the principal from high e®ort in enhancing the role for reciprocal incentives.
This last ¯nding allows us to extend our model to capture features of organizational struc-
ture. We predict a collocation of incentive pay and decision rights in a ¯rm's hierarchy
in ¯rms that use personality tests in their hiring procedure. Furthermore, in those ¯rms
incentive pay for non-managers should be less prevalent, i.e. they rely more on reciprocal
incentives, and the scope of performance pay for managers should be more narrowly de-
¯ned. In the UK WERS workplace survey we ¯nd these predictions of our extended model
con¯rmed.
Our study indicates that employing agents' reciprocity as a part of a ¯rms personnel policy
is a potentially promising alternative. However, it is important that various complementary
parts of a ¯rm's compensation and HR policy are coordinated to maximize the e®ect of
reciprocity. The size of gifts and the receiver of the reciprocal act have to be identi¯ed, and
naturally a ¯rm's hiring policy should also be adjusted to the intended use of compensation
practices - if a ¯rm plans to make use of reciprocity, the hired workforce better be reciprocal.
Obviously our study is but a step in the direction of more fully exploring this ¯eld. There
are various directions where this model could be developed to in order to allow further
theoretical as well as empirical analysis. Multitasking is a natural ¯rst step. Following
HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom (1991) a certain degree of intrinsic motivation is an important
ingredient to achieve (close to) e±cient allocation of e®ort across di®erent dimensions. In-
32troducing reciprocal motivations into their model could serve as a way to provide a speci¯c
micro-foundation for this intrinsic motivation. Hence studying multi-tasking together with
reciprocity should allow us to derive further detailed and testable predictions about contracts
and organizational structure.
Another possible direction would be to consider several ¯rms employing a mixture of sel¯sh
and reciprocal workers. Reciprocal workers are \valuable" to the ¯rm, in the sense that
agency costs are lower for highly reciprocal workers. Hence it is possible that competition
for reciprocal workers may cause segmentation in the market, where a niche of \high culture"
¯rms extensively uses personality tests to screen their new hires, employs reciprocal workers,
and provides generous but °at compensation packages, while other ¯rms employ sel¯sh
workers with strong explicit incentives.17
Lastly, further empirical work can explore the optimal magnitude of the gift and the
proper mix between reciprocal and explicit motivation to maximize the pro¯tability of gift
exchange. Our theoretical model suggests that a job where explicit incentives work poorly
due to a noisy production function, and where output is highly valuable to the principal is
the environment where reciprocal incentives should be striving.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of ´¤ (For both the two-action and multiple-action case)
By construction the Principal's problem is a convex minimization with linear constraints.
Therefore, for a given set of parameters, the optimal solution is unique. Moreover, by
Proposition 1 (for the two-action case) or Proposition 12 (for the multiple-action case) we
know that the value function for the principal's problem is non-increasing in ´. We proceed
by showing that the value function V (´) is absolutely continuous in ´. Since we know from
the sketch of the proof in the main text that there is an ´ large enough that the value function
is strictly smaller than for the standard ´ = 0 case, given absolute continuity, there must be
some ´¤ such that for ´ · ´¤ V (´) = V (0) (and therefore the standard contract is optimal),
and for ´ > ´¤ it holds that V (´) < V (0) (and therefore a reciprocity contract is optimal).
Moreover, since the solution for any ´ is unique, ´¤ is the point such that the optimal contract
derived by ignoring the [IR] coincides with the standard contract. Additionally, when ´ > ´¤
17See Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007) for a ¯rst step in this direction.
33we know that the optimal contract provides a strictly positive rent. Hence in this region,
we know that if we solve for the optimal contract by ignoring the [IR], we know that the
solution will in fact meet the [IR].
To prove the lemma, we prove continuity for the multiple action case.
Proof of continuity
Recall that in the multi-action case we have: N is the number of states, M is the number
of actions, a 2 A is the set of actions and u 2 (u(w);1) is the set of utilities.
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denote the value function, where u¤ is a solution
to P:
Proposition 9 V (´) is absolutely continuous in ´.
Proof. Consider the constrained program P 0 where u 2 U0 =
¡
u(w); ¹ U
¤N where ¹ U is a
¯nite number such that
V (0;^ a) > ¡¼h(¹ U) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)w 8 a 2 A
where ¼ = min
a;i
¼i(a) i.e. the smallest state probability. Hence ¹ U is a payment su±ciently
large so that the cheapest possible contract involving a payment of ¹ U is strictly dominated
by the standard contract. Hence any contract involving any payment larger than ¹ U will also
be strictly dominated
Therefore the program P 0 is equivalent to P, since their solution sets will be identical (any
contract feasible in P but not in P 0 is strictly dominated by a contract that is feasible in
both). Hence V 0(´) = V (´).
Now consider the constrained program P 00 where u 2 U00 =
£
u; ¹ U
¤N and where (1¡¼)¹ U +
¼u = u0 + ^ c. Any contract that involves a utility payment smaller than u violates the [IR],
34and thus is infeasible. Therefore the set of feasible contracts is identical between P 0 and P 00,
so the programs are equivalent. Hence V 00(´) = V 0(´) = V (´):
Since U00 is a compact, convex set; the continuity, concavity and di®erential conditions
on the objective function and the constraints are met, and a feasible point exists where all
the constraints are slack, the conditions of Milgrom and Segal (2002, Corollary 5) are met,
proving absolute continuity.
Corollary 5 from Milgrom and Segal (2002, pp. 597f):
Suppose that X is a convex compact set in a normed linear space, f and g are continuous
and concave in x;ft(x;t) and gt(x;t) are continuous in (x;t), and there exists ^ x 2 X such
that g(^ x;t) >> 0 for all t 2 [0;1]. Then:
(i) V is absolutely continuous, and for any selection (x¤(t);y¤(t)) 2 X¤(t) £ Y ¤(t);




(ii) V is directionally di®erentiable, and its directional derivatives equal:








Lt(x;y;t) for t < 1








Lt(x;y;t) for t > 0
Hence V (´) is absolutely continuous in ´, and thus the lemma follows.
5.2 The Optimal Contract for CRRA Utility
Proposition 10 For CRRA utility, the optimal contract is:
ui = K (©i(´))
1¡°
° where K =
¢c + (¹ u + c(^ a))´¢ER
P
¼i(^ a)(©i(´))




and ´¤ is de¯ned implicitly by














Proof. To ease exposition de¯ne ©i = ©i(´): We take the FOC assuming that the [IR] is
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can transform this to ui = K (©i)
1¡°
° :
35We can solve for K explicitly using the [IC] (which holds with equality)
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° = (¹ u + c(^ a))´¢ER + ¢c
K =





We can get a formula for ´¤ by plugging the optimal contract into a binding [IR] (since
at ´¤ the optimal reciprocity contract must coincide with the standard contract, where the
[IR] binds).
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Thus ´¤ is de¯ned implicitly s.t. the above equation holds.
5.3 The Optimal Contract for CARA Utility
Proposition 11 For CARA utility, the optimal contract is:
ui = K (©i(´))




and ´¤ is de¯ned implicitly by












36Proof. Again for convenience de¯ne ©i = ©i(´): We solve using the FOC's assuming the
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= ¸IC©i. With K = 1
¡®¸IC we can
transform this to ui = K (©i)
¡1 :
We solve for K explicitly using the [IC] (which holds with equality)
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¡1 = (¹ u + c(^ a))´¢ER + ¢c
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Thus ´¤ is de¯ned implicitly s.t. the above equation holds.
5.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 If G di®ers from F by only a single MPS, w¤(G);x¤(F) are the optimal contracts
given the distribution of likelihood ratios, and ´ ¸ max[´¤(F);´¤(G)] then w¤(G) Âmu x¤(F):
Proof. Since the number of states (and thus the number of distinct likelihood ratios) is
¯xed between F and G, then for G to di®er from F by a single MPS it means there is a
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With all other comparisons equal. Hence w¤(G) Âmu x¤(F) for (~ i;~ i;~ j;~ j). Moreover for
any state ~ k where ~ j · ~ k · ~ i;w¤(G) Âmu;~ k x¤(F):
5.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 If G is an MPS of F, w¤(G);x¤(F) are the optimal contracts given the distri-
bution of likelihood ratios, and ´ ¸ max[´¤(F);´¤(G)] then w¤(G) Âmu x¤(F): Additionally,
if G is a balanced MPS of F, then w¤(G) Âmu;¸ i x¤(F):
Proof. From Lemma 1 in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) (with corrected proof in Leshno,
Levy and Spector(1997)), there exists a sequence of distributions F0;:::;FL such that F0 =
F;FL = G, and Fl di®ers from Fl¡1 by only an MPS. Each Fl induces a reciprocity contract
x¤(Fl) (i.e. the solution to the principal's problem given Fl assuming that ¸IR = 0). We
do not need that for each Fl the optimal reciprocity contract is preferred to the optimal
standard contract, only that if the optimal reciprocity contract is well de¯ned for both G
and F, then it will be well de¯ned for all Fl.





(^ ¼)1Fl + ´¢ER(^ a) ¸ 0; which will ensure that all the marginal utilities are positive and
so there is a wage payment that satis¯es the FOC.



















1 +´¢ER(^ a) ¸ 0:
Therefore x¤(Fl) is well de¯ned for all Fl. From our Lemma 4 above we know x¤(Fl) Âmu
x¤(Fl¡1); and with transitivity the result obtains.
Additionally, note that if G is a balanced MPS of F with ~ i the largest state below the
balance point, then for each Fl, the states with increasing and decreasing likelihood ratios
will be above and below ~ i (respectively), and therefore x¤(Fl) Âmu;¸ i x¤(Fl¡1) for each Fl.
5.6 Multiple Action Case
5.6.1 General Results without Additional Distributional Assumptions
Consider the case where the agent is choosing between a set of actions a1 < a2 < ::: < am.
We assume that c(a) is increasing and convex in a, and that ER(a) is increasing and concave
in a. We begin by considering which results extend from the two action case without any
further assumptions on the distribution of output. As before, we focus on the implementation





s.t. [IR] U (ak;^ a) ¸ ¹ u ; [IC] U (ak;^ a) ¸ U (a
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0 ; [EB] ^ a = ak:







¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u ¸ 0
s:t:
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a
0))ui + ´
³X
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
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0
With the FOC's analogous to the two-action case
h








+ ´ (ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak))
¸
:
First, notice that Observations 1 - optimality of the standard contract for ´ = 0 - and 2 -
the standard contract is implementable for all ´ - extend directly from the two-action case.
For ´ = 0 the agent is sel¯sh, and in general the standard contract provides zero rent to
the agent, so the reciprocal portion of his utility drops out. Therefore the standard contract
39will implement ^ a for any ´. However, if ^ a is not the highest action, it is not the case that
any contract that implements ^ a for a given ´1 will still implement ^ a for any ´2 > ´1. This is
because the reciprocal portion of the agent's utility for an upwards [IC] is negative: working
harder would give a larger gift back to the principal. Hence if an upwards [IC] is binding,
then increasing ´ would make the agent strictly prefer the higher action. However, we can
show that for any increase in ´, a translation of the initial contract where all the utility
payments are shifted down by a constant ± will still implement ^ a.
Lemma 5 If ui implements ^ a given ´1 then for any ´2 > ´1, 9± ¸ 0 such that vi = ui ¡ ±
implements ^ a:








¼i(^ a)ui ¡ ¹ u ¡ c(^ a)]. For the [IR] we have
X
¼i(^ a)vi ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u =
hX




















¼i(^ a)ui ¡ ¹ u ¡ c(^ a)
i
¸ 0
Hence we can hold constant the value the agent places on the rent by scaling down the
rent by the ratio of ´1 to ´2.
And for any [IC] we have
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a
0))vi + ´2
³X
¼i(^ a)vi ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a










¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
i
(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a




(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a
0))ui + ´1
hX
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
i
(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a
0)] ¡ (c(^ a) ¡ c(a
0)) ¸ 0
Since ´ times the rent is held constant, as is the spread of wage payments across states, if
the ¯rst contract meets the [IC] then the second contract will as well.
Thus a cheaper contract with the same explicit incentives will implement ^ a. This imme-
diately implies that the cost to the principal of the second-best optimal contract is non-
increasing in ´, as it was in the two-action case.
Proposition 12 V (´;^ a) is non-increasing in ´ for all ^ a.
Proof. For any ´2 > ´1, apply Lemma 12 to the optimal contract given ´1. Therefore, the
optimal contract under ´2 must have at least as small a cost to the principal as under ´1,
and will have strictly lower cost if the optimal contract under ´1 yields a positive rent.
40Observations 3 - there exists a high enough °at wage that implements an e®ort level for
´ > 0 - and 4 - for ´ ! 1 the First Best is arbitrarily closely approximated with a °at wage
- also extend, though we have to be careful that the °at wage does not provide too large
a rent (which would induce the agent to change to a higher action). Since e®ort costs are
convex and expected revenue are concave, for a °at wage ui = ¹ u+c(^ a)+ ~ u the two relevant
IC's when ^ a = ak are:
´~ u(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak¡)) ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(ak¡1) and ´~ u(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak+1)) ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(ak+1):
Therefore the °at wage will implement ^ a if
c(ak+1)¡c(^ a)
´(ER(ak+1)¡ER(^ a)) ¸ ~ u ¸
c(^ a)¡c(ak¡1)
´(ER(^ a)¡ER(ak¡1)):
The interval is non-empty due to the the convexity of c and the concavity of ER, demonstrat-
ing Observation 3, and the lower limit shrinks to zero in the limit as ´ ! 1, demonstrating
Observation 4.
As in the two-action case, the lowest e®ort level can be implemented with a °at wage, and
has the same cost as in the ¯rst best.
Lemma 6 If ^ a = a1, then ui = ¹ u + c(^ a) is the optimal contract for all ´.
Proof. The [IR] holds with equality by construction. For each [IC] we have
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a
0))ui + ´
³X
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a
0)) ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(a0)
(¹ u + c(^ a))
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a
0)) + ´
³
(¹ u + c(^ a))
X
¼i(^ a) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a
0)) ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(a0)
0 ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(a0)
which is true since c(^ a) < c(a0) for all a0. Since this contract has a cost to the principal equal
to the ¯rst-best cost, it is optimal.
Next, we can show the standard result that for any optimal contract at least one downward
[IC] will bind. Since both explicit and reciprocal incentives are costly, this ensures that at
the optimum the principal is not providing excessive incentives.
Lemma 7 At the optimum, for at least one a0 < ^ a we have
X
(¼i(^ a) ¡ ¼i(a
0))ui + ´
³X
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u
´
(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(a
0)) = c(^ a) ¡ c(a
0):
Proof. Suppose instead that all downward [IC]s are slack. Then, since the principal's
problem is a convex problem, we can drop all of these constraints without a®ecting the
optimal solution. However, in this new problem ^ a is the lowest-cost action, and therefore a
41°at wage such that the [IR] binds is optimal. However, in the full problem this contract will
not implement ^ a - therefore the assumption leads to a contradiction.
Lastly, we can show that for high enough ´, the optimal contract is a reciprocity contract.
Proposition 13 There exists a ¯nite ´¤ such that for all ´ · ´¤ the optimal contract is
a standard contract (i.e. provides zero rent) and for all ´ > ´¤ the optimal contract is a
reciprocity contract (i.e. provides the agent with a strictly positive rent).
Proof. As before, we provide an upper bound on ´¤ by showing that a °at wage can induce
^ a strictly cheaper than the standard contract. Let ust be the standard contract, and let
_ w =
P
¼i(^ a)h(ust;i). Again we consider the °at wage ui = u( _ w ¡ ²) = _ u for some small ².
As before the [IR] will be strictly satis¯ed for ² small enough, and to satisfy the [IC]s we
simply must satisfy the [IC]s for ak¡1 and ak+1 (where ^ a = ak).
´ (_ u ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak¡)) ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(ak¡1)
´ (_ u ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak+1)) ¸ c(^ a) ¡ c(ak+1)
which implies
c(ak+1 ¡ c(^ a)
(_ u ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(ER(ak+1) ¡ ER(^ a))
¸ ´ ¸
c(^ a) ¡ c(ak¡1
(_ u ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)(ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak¡1))
The above condition will be satis¯ed for some ¯nite ´. Therefore the optimal positive-rent
contract will have strictly lower cost than the optimal zero-rent contract (i.e. the standard
contract), hence the optimal contract will be a reciprocity contract. For larger ´, we know
from Lemma 5 above, even smaller °at wages will continue to implement ^ a.
5.6.2 Assuming CDFC
We can extend all of the results from the two-action case if we can ¯nd assumptions that
ensure that at the optimum only one [IC] binds (and therefore the FOC's have the same
structure). To do so we need to demonstrate that for the optimal contract the agent's e®ort
decision is a concave problem. Fortunately, the combination of the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property (MLRP) and the Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC),
introduced by Rogerson (1985), is su±cient.
Let Fk(a) =
Pk
i=1 ¼i(a) denote the distribution function at state k given the action a.
42De¯nition 8 Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC): CDFC holds if for
a < a0 < a00 and for some ® where 0 · ® · 1 we have c(a0) = ®c(a00)+(1¡®)c(a) then
that implies Fk(a0) · ®Fk(a00) + (1 ¡ ®)Fk(a)8k = 1:::n:








0)(qi ¡ qi+1) + qn
¸ ®
³X
Fi(a)(qi ¡ qi+1) + qn
´
+ (1 ¡ ®)
³X
Fi(a
00)(qi ¡ qi+1) + qn
´
= ®ER(a) + (1 ¡ ®)ER(a
00)
We can then prove that with MLRP and CDFC, the optimal contract will be non-
decreasing.
Proposition 14 If MLRP and CDFC hold, then the optimal incentive scheme u¤
i satis¯es
u1 · u2 · ::: · un:
Proof. Consider the optimal contract for the relaxed problem where the agent can only
choose an action from faja · ^ ag. We know at the optimum of this problem that
h







+ ´ (ER(^ a) ¡ ER(ak))
¶
:
Since MLRP holds, at the optimum ui is non-decreasing. To show that this contract coincides
with the optimal contract, it su±ces to show that all of the [IC]s for higher actions are
satis¯ed.
Suppose to the contrary that a higher action is strictly preferred, i.e. for some a00 > ^ a we
have
X
¼i(^ a)ui+´ (¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(^ a)¡c(^ a) <
X
¼i(a
00)ui+´ (¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(a
00)¡c(a
00)
We know that a downward [IC] binds, i.e. for some a0 < ^ a we have
X
¼i(^ a)ui+´ (¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(^ a)¡c(^ a) =
X
¼i(a
0)ui+´ (¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(a
0)¡c(a
0)
Also, for some ® we have c(^ a) = ®c(a00) + (1 ¡ ®)c(a0), and from CDFC this implies
43Fk(^ a) · ®Fk(a00) + (1 ¡ ®)Fk(a0). Therefore
X
¼i(^ a)ui + ´ (¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(^ a) ¡ c(^ a)
=
X





























However, this contradicts the assumption that a00 is strictly preferred.
Additionally, since the optimal contract will be monotone, this ensures that the agent's
problem is concave. Hence only the local downward [IC] will bind.
Proposition 15 If MLRP and CDFC hold, then at the optimum for implementing ^ a = ak,
only the [IC] for ak¡1 binds.




¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(a)¡c(a) which
is equivalent to maxa
P
Fi(a)(ui ¡ ui+1)+un+´ (
P
¼i(^ a)ui ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)ER(a)¡c(a). Since
we know ui is non-decreasing, therefore the ¯rst term is concave by CDFC. Similarly, we
showed that ER(a) is concave in a, and c is convex. Therefore the agent's problem is concave,
and so the local downward [IC] is su±cient for a global maximum.
Since only one [IC] is binding, then the multi-action case is equivalent to the two-action
case where ^ a = ak and replacing a1 with ak¡1. Therefore all our results from the two-action
model extend.
Corollary 7 If MLRP and CDFC hold, then Propositions 2 to 5 and Corollaries 2 and 3
hold.
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